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viewpoint had no effect on self-identification, but depended 
on the viewed object and visuotactile synchrony. Self-
location depended on visuospatial viewpoint (first experi-
ment) and visuotactile synchrony (second experiment). Our 
results show that the visuospatial viewpoint from which the 
virtual body is seen during FBIs modulates the subjective 
1PP and that such viewpoint manipulations contribute to 
spatial aspects of BSC. We compare the present data with 
recent data revealing vestibular contributions to the subjec-
tive 1PP and discuss the multisensory nature of BSC and 
the subjective 1PP.
Keywords Bodily self-consciousness · Multisensory 
integration · First-person perspective · Full-body illusion · 
Visuospatial viewpoint
Introduction
Everyday we experience that self and body are bound 
together. In order to explain how our brain generates this 
embodied experience, research on the neural underpin-
ning of bodily self-consciousness (BSC) proposed that 
BSC consists of at least three main aspects: i.e., self-
identification, that is the feeling that a particular body 
is mine, self-location, that is the feeling of where ‘I’ am 
located in space, and first-person perspective (1PP), that 
is the feeling from where ‘I’ experience the world around 
me (Blanke and Metzinger 2009; Blanke 2012; Serino 
et al. 2013).
Research in neurological patients with out-of-body 
experiences (OBE) has shown that these three phenomenal 
aspects may be dissociated from the location of the physi-
cal body. During an OBE, patients typically experience 
ownership for an illusory body in external space (abnormal 
Abstract  Self-consciousness is based on multisensory 
signals from the body. In full-body illusion (FBI) experi-
ments, multisensory conflict was used to induce changes in 
three key aspects of bodily self-consciousness (BSC): self-
identification (which body ‘I’ identify with), self-location 
(where ‘I’ am located), and first-person perspective (from 
where ‘I’ experience the world; 1PP). Here, we adapted a 
previous FBI protocol in which visuotactile stroking was 
administered by a robotic device (tactile stroking) and 
simultaneously rendered on the back of a virtual body (vis-
ual stroking) that participants viewed on a head-mounted 
display as if filmed from a posterior viewpoint of a cam-
era. We compared the effects of two different visuospatial 
viewpoints on the FBI and thereby on these key aspects 
of BSC. During control manipulations, participants saw a 
no-body object instead of a virtual body (first experiment) 
or received asynchronous versus synchronous visuotactile 
stroking (second experiment). Results showed that within-
subjects visuospatial viewpoint manipulations affected the 
subjective 1PP ratings if a virtual body was seen but had no 
effect for viewing a non-body object. However, visuospatial 
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self-identification), they feel their self as elevated above 
their physical body (abnormal self-location) from where 
they experience to perceive the world, including their phys-
ical body (abnormal 1PP; Blanke and Mohr 2005; Blanke 
et al. 2002, 2004; De Ridder et al. 2007). In these studies 
OBEs were linked to the brain’s impaired integration of 
visual, vestibular, tactile, and proprioceptive sensory sig-
nals (Blanke et al. 2002; Ionta et al. 2011), suggesting that 
under normal conditions BSC might be based on multisen-
sory integration mechanisms (Blanke et al. 2004).
Further evidence for this hypothesis came from behav-
ioral experiments in healthy participants that used the so-
called full-body illusion (FBI). During one type of FBI, 
participants received spatially and temporally conflicting 
sensory information about the location, shape, or size of 
their body as seen on a head-mounted display. In these 
studies, participants saw a virtual body from the viewpoint 
of a camera that filmed the participant’s body from behind 
(2 m distance) and simultaneously received tactile strok-
ing at their physical body (unseen by them) and viewed 
stroking applied to the back of the virtual body. When 
stroking was applied in a synchronous fashion partici-
pants typically reported increased self-identification and a 
concomitant bias in self-location toward the virtual body 
(Lenggenhager et al. 2007; Ehrsson 2007; Guterstam and 
Ehrsson 2012). These changes in self-identification and 
self-location were accompanied by changes in visuotac-
tile and audiovisual integration (Aspell et al. 2009, 2010), 
mental imagery (Lenggenhager et al. 2009; Pfeiffer et al. 
2013; Ionta et al. 2011), physiological responses to threat 
(Petkova et al. 2011; Petkova and Ehrsson 2008; Ehrs-
son 2007), body temperature (Salomon et al. 2013), and 
pain responses (Romano et al. 2014; Hänsel et al. 2011). 
This shows that self-identification and self-location can 
be experimentally manipulated and that this manipulation 
modulates cognitive as well as physiological processes 
regarding the own body.
However, considerably less is known about the multi-
sensory mechanisms underlying the 1PP. Moreover, most 
research has defined and investigated the 1PP in terms of 
visual or visuospatial properties, whereas less attention has 
been given to the multisensory properties of the subjective 
1PP, defined as the subjective experience of being directed 
at the world (Blanke and Metzinger 2009; Metzinger 2003; 
Ionta et al. 2011; Blanke 2012; Pfeiffer et al. 2013). The 
former ‘perspective’ has been defined and investigated as 
the visuospatial viewpoint of a given visual scene as seen 
by the participant and thus as centered on the participant’s 
physical body (egocentric viewpoint). This egocentric 
viewpoint was contrasted with a third-person viewpoint or 
‘perspective’ defined by a visuospatial viewpoint centered 
at another spatial position of the same scene, but different 
from the participant’s physical body position (allocentric 
viewpoint; Vogeley and Fink 2003; Vogeley et al. 2004). 
Insights gained from such explicit visual manipulations of 
egocentric versus allocentric viewpoints, by task instruc-
tion and visual stimulation, provided important insights 
into processes underlying human social cognition (Aich-
horn et al. 2006; Baron-Cohen et al. 1985; Frith and Frith 
2003, 2005, 2006), mental spatial transformation (Arzy 
et al. 2006), and autobiographical memory (Freton et al. 
2013). However, it is not known how such viewpoint 
changes relate functionally and neurally to the perspectival 
element of BSC: the subjective 1PP.
Ego- and allocentric visuospatial viewpoint manipu-
lations as described above have also been used to inves-
tigate their effect on self-identification in a virtual body 
transfer illusion and the FBI. In an immersive virtual 
reality experiment, Slater et al. (2010) presented partici-
pants with a virtual body and virtual scene as seen from 
an egocentric (first-person) viewpoint or from a laterally 
shifted allocentric (third-person) viewpoint. Participants’ 
head movements congruently updated the virtual scen-
ery as seen from each viewpoint, thus providing visuo-
motor congruency that enhanced the level of immersion. 
Furthermore, participants received synchronous or asyn-
chronous visuotactile stimulation. Results showed that 
self-identification ratings and physiological responses 
(i.e., heart rate deceleration) were higher in the egocen-
tric than allocentric viewpoint conditions and that in the 
allocentric viewpoint condition stroking additionally 
modulated these dependent measures of self-identifi-
cation. In a different study by Petkova et al. (2011), the 
FBI was induced by presenting to participants either an 
egocentric or allocentric viewpoint of the abdomen of a 
mannequin and through additional application of visuo-
tactile stroking (again in synchronous or asynchronous 
fashion). The authors found that self-identification rat-
ings and physiological responses (here: skin conductance 
response to threat) were generally higher for egocentric 
than allocentric viewpoints and that stroking modulated 
the responses only in the egocentric viewpoint condi-
tion. Both Slater et al. (2010) and Petkova et al. (2011) 
found that self-identification depended on the congru-
ency between the visuospatial viewpoint and the physical 
body and on viewpoint-dependent effects of visuotactile 
stroking synchrony. However, whereas visuotactile strok-
ing affected self-identification in the allocentric but not in 
the egocentric viewpoint condition in the study by Slater 
et al. (2010), the opposite pattern of result was found in 
the study by Petkova et al. (2011). Because viewpoint 
manipulations differed between the studies (e.g., later-
ally shifted vs. front-facing allocentric viewpoints), it is 
still unclear which specific visuospatial parameters ena-
ble multisensory conflicts (e.g., visuotactile stroking) to 
induce changes in BSC (e.g., self-identification).
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How does the subjective 1PP differ from a mere visual 
viewpoint from where a scene is perceived? Can changes 
of the visual viewpoint as tested in these previous stud-
ies modulate not only self-identification, but also spatial 
aspects of BSC such as the subjective 1PP or self-location? 
Evidence for a dissociation between visual viewpoint and 
subjective 1PP comes from neurological patients with OBE 
who reported spatial dissociations between their visual 
and auditory viewpoints and their subjectively experi-
enced 1PP (Blanke et al. 2004) and also from patients with 
heautoscopy who alternatingly experienced their subjec-
tive 1PP at two distinct visuospatial viewpoints (Brugger 
et al. 1994; Heydrich and Blanke 2013). De Ridder et al. 
(2007) for example reported a patient who experienced to 
see the world from one viewpoint, while experiencing his 
subjective 1PP and self-location at a different spatial loca-
tion. This anecdotal clinical evidence about distinct brain 
mechanisms of visual viewpoint versus the subjective 
1PP was corroborated by empirical data in healthy sub-
jects revealing the multisensory mechanisms (tactile, pro-
prioceptive, vestibular, and visual) of the subjective 1PP. 
This was addressed in two FBI studies that quantified the 
subjective 1PP as a dependent variable (Ionta et al. 2011; 
Pfeiffer et al. 2013). In the study by Ionta et al. (2011), 
participants were presented with visuotactile and visuoves-
tibular conflicts during the FBI. Visuovestibular conflicts 
consisted of a difference between participant’s body pos-
ture and the direction of visual gravitational stimuli. Par-
ticipants lay supine, thus vestibular signals from the otolith 
organs signaled that the body was facing upwards rela-
tive to earth vertical. At the same time, participants saw a 
video that showed a virtual body in prone posture that was 
filmed from an elevated location with the camera facing 
downwards. Thus, vestibular signals (upward direction) 
and visual signals (downward direction) were in directional 
conflict. Under these FBI conditions, it was found that half 
of the experimental participants experienced an upward 
direction of their subjective 1PP (congruent with vestibular 
signals), whereas the other half of the participants experi-
enced a downward direction of their subjective 1PP (con-
gruent with visual signals). It was found that participants’ 
judgments of self-location depended on these individual 
differences in subjective 1PP. These results were replicated 
by Pfeiffer et al. (2013) in a different subject sample and 
it was, moreover, found that individual differences in sub-
jective 1PP were congruent with individual differences in 
visuovestibular integration (as investigated through sub-
jective verticality judgments). Participants with an upward 
direction of the subjective 1PP (congruent with vestibu-
lar signals) were less affected by a visual distractor dur-
ing subjective verticality judgments, as compared to par-
ticipants with a downward direction of the subjective 1PP 
(congruent with visual signals), who were more biased by 
the visual distractor. Together these results demonstrate 
that the subjective 1PP was congruent with changes in self-
location during the FBI, could be manipulated as a depend-
ent variable between-subjects, and depended on the weight-
ing of visuovestibular signals.
However, it is not known whether systematic changes in 
the experienced direction of the subjective 1PP can also be 
induced experimentally within and not just between sub-
jects and whether visual viewpoint manipulations impact 
the subjective 1PP. Here, we asked whether additionally 
manipulating visuospatial viewpoints during the FBI could 
induce within-subject changes of the subjective 1PP and 
other aspects of BSC (self-location, self-identification). 
For this, we here repeatedly induced the FBI by robotically 
supported visuotactile stroking (similar to Pfeiffer et al. 
2013) and measured within-subjects the subjective 1PP as 
the dependent variable. We manipulated the visuospatial 
viewpoint from which a virtual body was seen on a head-
mounted display by combining spatial elevation (high vs. 
low) with inclination (downward vs. upward) that resulted 
in two viewpoint conditions: high-downward and low-
upward viewpoints. Importantly, participants’ body posture 
and the virtual body posture were not manipulated but were 
kept constant throughout the experiment. We hypothesized 
that viewpoint inclination would induce congruent changes 
of the subjective 1PP. In order to test whether these changes 
were specific to seeing a human body or would generalize 
also to non-body objects, we introduced the experimental 
manipulation Object (body, object) in the paradigm. We 
hypothesized that during the FBI only seeing a human 
body and not a non-body object would modulate the sub-
jective 1PP. In a follow-up experiment, we manipulated the 
synchrony of visuotactile stroking during these viewpoint 
manipulations in order to link our results from the first 




In the first experiment, 25 participants were tested (nine 
females, mean age of 22 years, range of 18–28 years), and 
in the second experiment, 19 participants were tested (eight 
females, mean age of 22 years, range of 18–30 years). Par-
ticipants were students at the Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale 
de Lausanne, had normal- or corrected-to-normal eyesight, 
and had no history of neurologic or psychiatric disorder. 
Participants verbally indicated that they were strongly 
right-handed. The experimental protocol was approved by 
the local ethics committee—La Commission d’Ethique 
de la Recherche Clinique de la Faculté et de Medicine de 
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l’Université de Lausanne—and was performed in accord-
ance with the ethical standards laid down in the 1964 Dec-
laration of Helsinki. All participants gave their informed 
consent prior to their inclusion in the experiment and after 
the experiment they were fully debriefed about the experi-
mental purpose and received a monetary compensation of 
30 Swiss Francs.
Experimental setup
In a darkened room, a custom-made robotic device was 
mounted on a table at 90 cm above the floor. Figure 1a, b 
shows the experimental setup and the robotic device which 
had 200 cm × 90 cm × 10 cm dimensions and two sepa-
rate stroking units for tactile stimulation at the back of a 
participant lying supine on the device (Duenas et al. 2011). 
Stroking units had 20 cm movement range along a linear 
trajectory, 2–12 cm/s velocity during stroking and were 
actuated by ultrasonic motors (Shinsei, USR60-E3N, 
Japan, http://www.shinsei-motor.com). A plastic sphere 
was mounted on an elastic blade of the stroking unit, which 
allowed for adaptation of stroking to participant’s back 
curvature. A soft foam cover on the robotic device allowed 
participants to comfortably lie supine during the experi-
ment. The foam had gaps allowing the plastic spheres to 
touch the participant’s back. Participants wore a white cot-
ton shirt to reduce frictions between the plastic sphere and 
their back.
Stroking profiles were programmed in MATLAB soft-
ware (MathWorks, version R13, http://www.mathworks.ch) 
and saved in text files that were used to determine robotic 
stroking paths in LabVIEW software (National Instruments 
Corporation, version 2010b, www.ni.com/labview).
Visual stimuli were presented to participants on a head-
mounted display (HMD, Virtual Realities, Virtual Viewer 3D, 
www.vrealities.com/virtualviewer3d.html) with a resolution of 
800 × 600 pixels, representing about 35° of visual angle. Par-
ticipants wore headphones that presented white noise to cover 
the acoustic cues from the movements of the robotic device. 
In-house software (ExpyVR, http://lnco.epfl.ch/expyvr) was 
used for visual stimulus presentation, real-time synchroniza-
tion of visual stroking with robotic stroking, and response 
recording. Responses were recorded with a serial keypad (Tar-
gus Numeric Keypad AKP10US, www.targus.com) on which 
participants responded with their right hand.
Experimental design
A full-factorial 2 × 2 repeated measures experimental design 
was used in each experiment. In the first experiment, the 
experimental factors were Viewpoint (levels: high, low) and 
Object (levels: body, non-body) resulting in four experimen-
tal conditions: (1) high Viewpoint and body Object; (2) high 
Viewpoint and non-body Object; (3) low Viewpoint and body 
Object; (4) low Viewpoint and non-body Object (Fig. 1c). In 
the second experiment, the experimental factors were View-
point (levels: high, low) and Stroking (levels: synchronous, 
asynchronous) resulting in four experimental conditions: (1) 
high Viewpoint and synchronous Stroking; (2) high Viewpoint 
and asynchronous Stroking; (3) low Viewpoint and synchro-
nous Stroking; (4) low Viewpoint and asynchronous Stroking.
Stimuli
Visual stimuli were photorealistic images showing a 
human body (body Object; first and second experiment) 
Fig. 1  Experimental setup and stimuli. a Participants were lying 
supine on a robotic device that applied tactile stroking and wore a 
head-mounted display in which they saw visual stimuli. Responses 
were given by button press with the right hand and participants were 
holding a ball with the left hand  to facilitate mental imagery in the 
mental ball dropping task. b Robotic device used for tactile stimula-
tion. Two stroking units (white circles) were stroking the back of a 
participant lying comfortably on soft foam. c Visual stimuli showed 
from a high or low visuospatial viewpoint a virtual human body or 
a non-body object. Visuotactile stroking consisted of red dots (rep-
resented here by white circles) that moved along the backside of the 
virtual body or object (black arrows represent movement ranges of 
the dots) and followed the viewpoint-congruent trajectories
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or a non-body object of rectangular shape and compara-
ble height and width (non-body Object; first experiment). 
Both objects were standing upright, i.e., their longitudinal 
axis was aligned with gravitational vertical. Photos for the 
stimuli were taken from a fixed eye-to-object distance of 
2 m, which was centered on the upper part of the object. 
The photos were taken from different camera-centered 
visuospatial viewpoints, as relative to eye level of an aver-
age sized observer. Specifically, the photos were taken from 
1 m above (or below) eye level and were declined (inclined) 
by 30° downward to the ground (or upward to the ceiling 
of the experimental room). All visual cues surrounding 
the object were then masked by black color to not provide 
participants with cues about the spatial environment. This 
resulted in two types of stimuli for the high Viewpoint and 
low Viewpoint experimental conditions.
Differently to previous studies (Petkova et al. 2011; 
Slater et al. 2010), all visuospatial viewpoints in the pre-
sent study were camera-centered and distinct from the 
viewpoint of the virtual body (allocentric viewpoints). 
However, because the images were presented to the par-
ticipant on a head-mounted display and thus the camera 
viewpoint matched participant’s viewpoint, participants 
perceived the virtual body as if located a few meters in 
front of them (egocentric viewpoint). Moreover, visual 
context surrounding the virtual body was removed, such 
that the viewpoint locations with respect to the external 
environment were unknown to participants. Thus, a clear 
definition of our viewpoint manipulations as either ego-
centric or allocentric seems difficult. Instead, in line with 
many previous FBI studies, we used camera-centered 
viewpoints of a virtual body from a distance to induce 
changes in BSC from the camera viewpoint in the direc-
tion of the location and viewpoint of the virtual body 
(Lenggenhager et al. 2007; Aspell et al. 2009; Ionta et al. 
2011; Pfeiffer et al. 2013).
The body object had male gender and was presented to 
all experimental participants, who were males or females. 
In order to assess whether gender-mismatch (i.e., male vir-
tual body presented to female participants) had confounded 
our experimental data, we ran a preliminary analysis of 
our data consisting of including a between-subjects factor 
Gender in all ANOVAs laid out in the ‘Analysis’ section. 
Results showed no gender-related main effects or interac-
tions (all F values <1), suggesting that gender-mismatch 
did not affect our data, and we therefore decided to include 
all data from all participants in subsequent statistical 
analysis.
In addition to visuospatial viewpoint, we manipulated 
the synchrony of visuotactile stroking (second experi-
ment) in order to be able to compare our results to previ-
ous studies on the FBI. Visual stroking consisted of virtu-
ally augmenting two red dots on the back of the virtual 
body/object and moving them along pre-defined stroking 
sequences (Fig. 1c, black arrows indicate the movement 
range of the red dots). Visual stroking was applied along 
a movement range that was centered on the virtual body/
object; the motion of the red dot corresponded to the visu-
ospatial viewpoint manipulation. Specifically, a down-
ward stroke along the virtual body/object was visually 
seen in the high (low) Viewpoint condition as two red dots 
converging (diverging) and decreasing (increasing) in size 
and thus followed congruently the anatomy of the virtual 
body/object (Fig. 1c, see difference in orientation of black 
arrows in high and low viewpoint condition). Tactile 
stroking consisted of moving two plastic spheres along 
the back of the participant lying on the robotic device 
(Fig. 1a, b).
The sequences of visual stroking (seen on the HMD) 
and tactile stroking (felt on participant’s back) were either 
synchronous (first and second experiment) or asynchronous 
(second experiment). Two stroking profiles were created 
before the experiment. Each profile consisted of a random 
sequence of positions in 0–20 cm distance range, 2–12 cm/s 
velocity range, and 40 s duration. The stroking profiles var-
ied randomly in length, speed, direction, and inter-stroke-
intervals (0–1.5 s). Thus, when different profiles were 
simultaneously executed they were spatially incongruent. 
During the experiment, either twice the same profile or 
both incongruent profiles were randomly assigned to the 
red dots (seen on the HMD) and the stroking units (touch-
ing the back of the participant), which resulted in synchro-
nous or asynchronous visuotactile stroking.
Measures of bodily self-consciousness
Subjective 1PP was measured by presenting to participants 
on the HMD the phrase ‘Orientation?’ in white on black 
background along with the words ‘upward’ and ‘down-
ward’ at the left and right bottom of the screen. Participants 
were trained to rate by button press their experienced direc-
tion of the subjective 1PP according to the question ‘Did 
you have the impression as if you were looking upward/
downward at a body/object above/below you?’. Participants 
responded with two alternative forced choices using either 
the right index finger for rating ‘upward’ (coded 0) or the 
right middle finder for rating ‘downward’ (coded 1).
Self-location was measured using the mental ball drop-
ping (MBD) task, which has previously been shown to be 
a sensitive measure of self-location (Lenggenhager et al. 
2009; Ionta et al. 2011; Pfeiffer et al. 2013). The MBD task 
was performed in three sequential steps: First, participants 
imagined to drop a ball from their hand upon which they 
pressed a button with their right index finger; secondly, 
they imagined the ball falling toward the ground during 
which they held the button depressed; finally, participants 
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imagined the ball hitting the ground upon which they 
released the button. The duration of button press (response 
time, RT) was used as a measure of self-location (i.e., 
height) above the ground. Note that participants were 
familiarized with the task procedure before the experi-
ment and performed at least 20 repetitions of the MBD task 
before the experiment.
Self-identification, along with other items on illusory 
touch and other self-related experiences, were rated in 
the FBI questionnaire (Lenggenhager et al. 2009; Pfeiffer 
et al. 2013). Figure 3c lists all items of the questionnaire. 
The questionnaire inquired about the quality of the FBI 
experience and each question was presented separately 
on the screen in white color on black background in the 
center of the screen along with a visual analogue scale, 
i.e., a horizontal and continuous visual scale with 11 
levels. Questions were presented in random order; par-
ticipants had no time limits to answer each question and 
gave their ratings by navigating a mouse curser along 
the visual analogue scale. Questions had an 11-point 
scale that ranged from 1 (‘weak feeling’) to 11 (‘strong 
feeling’).
Procedure
Each of the four experimental conditions was repeated 15 
times in random order. The total of 60 experimental trials 
was presented in three separate runs of 20 trials. Between 
runs participants were allowed pauses in lying posture on 
the robotic device.
An experimental trial began with presenting visuo-
tactile stroking for 40 s. Participants were instructed to 
attend simultaneously to the visual stimulation (seen on the 
HMD) and the tactile stimulation (felt on the participant’s 
back). Immediately after that, tactile stroking stopped and 
all visual stimuli were removed from the HMD and a black 
screen was shown for 1 s. Then, an auditory beep sound 
was presented for 200 ms, cueing participants to perform 
a MBD task within 6 s (adapted from Lenggenhager et al. 
2009; Ionta et al. 2011; Pfeiffer et al. 2013), this procedure 
was repeated three times resulting in three repeated meas-
ures of MBD RTs. After that, participants rated their sub-
jective 1PP by button press within 6 s. Then a fixation cross 
was presented on the screen during a resting phase of 15 s 
before the next trial began.
After having completed the FBI experiment on the 
robotic device, participants were comfortably seated in 
front of a computer screen on which they rated the FBI 
questionnaire separately for each of four experimental 
conditions. Between subjects, the order of condition-wise 
questionnaire administration and the order of question were 
randomized. There was no time limit to complete the ques-
tionnaire ratings.
Analysis
After having recorded raw data from all participants, the 
data were pre-processed and condition-averages were 
calculated.
Subjective 1PP ratings were processed by calculating 
proportion scores by dividing the number of ‘downward’ 
ratings by the number of total ratings for each condition. 
Omitted responses (<5 % per subject) were excluded from 
this analysis. Proportion scores indicated the proportion of 
having rated ‘downward’ in each experimental condition 
and ranged from 0 (never rated ‘downward’) to 1 (always 
rated ‘downward’).
Response times (RTs) from the MBD task (i.e., measure 
of self-location) were processed by removal of omissions 
and RTs shorter than 200 ms (<5 % per subject), which 
is considered too short for this type of mental imagery 
(Pfeiffer et al. 2013; Lenggenhager et al. 2009). First, we 
calculated trial-average RTs across three subsequent repeti-
tions of the MBD task and then calculated condition-aver-
age RTs for each participant.
FBI questionnaire ratings were recorded separately for 
four experimental conditions with each 10 questions. In 
order to account for response tendencies of participants, 
e.g., general (dis-)agreement to all questions or gener-
ally using extreme ends of the scale, that might have con-
founded the interpretation of questionnaire data, we trans-
formed the data to ipsative scores (Broughton and Wasel 
1990; Cattell 1944). Ipsative normalization was performed 
within-subjects and consisted of calculating across all 
questions the average score and the standard deviation of 
scores. Then, each rating was centered (i.e., subtracting the 
average score) and normalized (i.e., divided by the standard 
deviation). Ipsative scores reflect agreement (i.e., positive 
values) or disagreement (i.e., negative values) relative to 
the average response of the participant across all questions 
(i.e., zero value), where each unit reflects a standard devia-
tion agreement (+1) or disagreement (−1) with question-
naire item. This procedure resulted in condition-wise ipsa-
tive scores for each question.
Condition-average subjective 1PP ratings and RTs from 
the MBD task were statistically analyzed using separate 
2 × 2 repeated measures ANOVAs. For proportion scores 
of 1PP and RTs for self-location, we applied an a priori 
alpha level threshold of .05. Post hoc comparisons were 
performed for significant interactions from the ANOVA 
and thus an alpha level threshold of .05 was used—uncor-
rected for multiple comparisons. Questionnaire data of 10 
questions were analyzed using separate 2 × 2 repeated 
measures ANOVAs for each of the questions. We cor-
rected for multiple comparisons using Bonferroni correc-
tion (Bonferroni 1935), which resulted in an alpha level 
threshold of .005.





Statistical analysis revealed a main effect of Viewpoint 
(F(1, 24) = 10.80, p = .003, η2 = .31; Fig. 2a), reflect-
ing more frequent ‘downward’ 1PP for high Viewpoint 
(M = .64, SE = .06) than for low Viewpoint (M = .32, 
SE = .05), which shows congruency between 1PP ratings 
and visual viewpoint inclination (see ‘Stimuli’ section). 
Critically, we also found a significant Viewpoint × Object 
interaction (F(1, 24) = 8.22, p = .008, η2 = .26; Fig. 2a), 
reflecting that when participants were presented with a 
virtual body they rated to have experienced a ‘downward’ 
direction of the 1PP more frequently in the high Viewpoint 
condition (M = .75, SE = .07) compared to low Viewpoint 
condition (M = .21, SE = .05) (post hoc paired-samples t 
test: t(24) = 5.16, p < .001). Instead, when presented with 
a non-body object, participants rated the subjective 1PP not 
differently between high Viewpoint (M = .53, SE = .07) 
and low Viewpoint (M = .44, SE = .08; post hoc paired-
samples t test: t value < 1). These results suggest that the 
effects of the visuospatial viewpoint on the subjective 1PP 
are body-specific.
Self‑location
Statistical analysis of MBD RTs showed a marginally sig-
nificant main effect of Viewpoint (F(1, 24) = 4.17, p = .052, 
η2 = .15; Fig. 2b) with slightly higher self-location for 
high Viewpoint (M = 926 ms, SE = 41 ms) than for low 
Viewpoint (M = 914 ms, SE = 41 ms). Thus, self-location 
showed a difference in height estimation congruent with 
the viewpoint elevation manipulation. There was no main 
effect of Object and no Viewpoint × Object interaction (all 
F values <1). Together these results suggest that visuospa-
tial viewpoint tended to affect self-location independently 
of whether a body or non-body object was shown. Note that 
all experimental conditions were presented in synchronous 
visuotactile stroking, which typically induces self-location 
changes in the direction of the seen virtual body during the 
FBI (Ionta et al. 2011; Lenggenhager et al. 2009).
Fig. 2  Results from Experi-
ment 1 (a–c) and Experiment 2 
(d–f) for subjective 1PP ratings 
(a, d), RTs of the MBD task, 
our measure of self-location,  
(b, e) and questionnaire ratings 
for self-identification (c, f). 
Error bars in all plots show 
95 % confidence intervals of 
within-subjects interaction 
variance from the repeated 
measures ANOVA (Loftus  
and Masson 1994)
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FBI questionnaire
Figure 3a summarizes the questionnaire results. FBI ques-
tionnaire score analysis revealed a significant main effect of 
Object for self-identification (Q1: F(1, 24) = 19.39, p < .001, 
η2 = .45; Fig. 2c), reflecting higher scores for the body Object 
condition (M = −.34, SE = .14) than the non-body Object 
condition (M = −1.05, SE = .09). We also found a main 
effect of Object for illusory touch (Q3: F(1, 24) = 31.90, 
p < .001, η2 = .57) showing higher scores for the body Object 
condition (M = 1.17, SE = .16) than the non-body Object 
condition (M = .07, SE = .17). No further questions showed 
a significant main effect of Object, and there were no main 
effects of Viewpoint and no viewpoint × object interac-
tion. Together these results suggest that during synchronous 
visuotactile stimulation, self-identification and illusory touch 
increased when stroking was visually presented on a virtual 
human body as compared to a non-body object. These results 
likely reflect effects of top-down knowledge about body-iden-
tity on self-identification and illusory touch.
Summary of results
Our results showed that manipulating participants’ visu-
ospatial viewpoint and the identity of the visual stimulus 
during the FBI affected three components of BSC. In par-
ticular, visuospatial viewpoint had a specific effect on self-
location, but not on self-identification as measured through 
questionnaire scores: Participants localized themselves 
toward a higher location in the high Viewpoint conditions. 
Conversely, object identity selectively affected self-identi-
fication and, in line with previous studies, self-identifica-
tion was rated higher when a virtual body was presented as 
compared to a non-body object (Lenggenhager et al. 2007; 
Aspell et al. 2009). Finally, only the experienced direction 
of the 1PP was affected by the combination of the two fac-
tors and visuospatial viewpoint effects on subjective 1PP 




Statistical analysis revealed a main effect of Viewpoint 
(F(1, 18) = 5.91, p = .026, η2 = .25; Fig. 2d), reflect-
ing more frequent ‘downward’ 1PP for high Viewpoint 
(M = .59, SE = .08) than for low Viewpoint (M = .31, 
SE = .06). These results are consistent with results from 
experiment 1. The analysis showed no main effect of 
Fig. 3  Questionnaire results 
summarized. a–b Ipsative 
scores for all questions (y-axis) 
as a function of experimental 
conditions (shades of gray) 
indicate participants average 
responses by a value of zero and 
agreement (+) and disagree-
ment (−) in standard deviation 
units. Error bars show 95 % 
confidences intervals. c Ques-
tions of the FBI questionnaire
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Stroking and no Viewpoint × Stroking interaction (all F 
values <1).
Self‑location
Statistical analysis of MBD RTs showed a main effect of 
Stroking (F(1, 18) = 6.44, p = .021, η2 = .26; Fig. 2e) 
with higher self-location for the synchronous Stroking 
(M = 866 ms, SE = 51 ms) than for the asynchronous 
Stroking conditions (M = 855 ms, SE = 50 ms). These 
results show that the self-location drifted upwards toward 
the image of the virtual body (shown in the HMD) and was 
thus corresponding to the direction of participants’ body 
posture lying on the back. However, there was no main 
effect of Viewpoint and no viewpoint × stroking interac-
tion (all F values <1). These results suggest that visuospa-
tial viewpoint had no effect on self-location, but that self-
location drifted independently of viewpoint in an upward 
direction congruently with participants’ body orientation on 
the robotic device.
FBI questionnaire
Figure 3b summarizes the questionnaire results. Ques-
tionnaire score analysis revealed a significant main 
effects of Stroking for questions inquiring about self-
identification (Q1: F(1, 18) = 32.61, p < .001, η2 = .64; 
Q2: F(1, 18) = 12.87, p = .002, η2 = .42; Fig. 2f) 
and illusory touch (Q3: F(1, 18) = 112.10, p < .001, 
η2 = .86; Q4: F(1, 18) = 29.21, p < .001, η2 = .62). 
The two questions concerning self-identification showed 
a consistent result: Self-identification with the virtual 
body (Q1) was rated higher for synchronous (M = .09, 
SE = .18) than asynchronous Stroking (M = −.94, 
SE = .14), and identifying the virtual body as being 
somebody else (Q2) was rated higher for asynchro-
nous (M = 1.00, SE = .22) than synchronous stroking 
(M = .39, SE = .23). Both questions on illusory touch 
were rated higher for synchronous (Q3: M = 1.11, 
SE = .11; Q4: M = .49, SE = .23) than asynchronous 
Stroking (Q3: M = −.87, SE = .17; Q4: M = −.83, 
SE = .15). These results are consistent with previous 
FBI studies using a variety of different stimulation and 
virtual reality protocols (Ehrsson 2007; Lenggenha-
ger et al. 2007, 2009; Petkova et al. 2011). None of the 
questions that are generally given as control questions 
in the FBI (Q5−Q10) showed significant main effects 
or interactions. Subjective 1PP, in addition to trial-wise 
ratings, was also rated in the FBI questionnaire. Nota-
bly, no question showed a main effect or interaction with 
Viewpoint, thus neither self-identification ratings (Q1, 
Q2), nor illusory touch ratings (Q3, Q4) were affected 
by visuospatial viewpoint (all p values >.5).
Discussion
Within-subject manipulation of subjective 1PP
We found that within-subjects subjective 1PP changed con-
gruently with our visuospatial viewpoint manipulations, 
although the physical body of our participants was upward-
directed in supine posture throughout all experiments. Par-
ticipants experienced a downward-directed 1PP more often 
when they saw a virtual body from a downward-directed 
viewpoint than from an upward-directed viewpoint. Nota-
bly, these changes were obtained by repeated measure-
ments within-subjects and agree with the phenomenology 
of OBEs of neurological origin. Patients often experience 
disembodied downward-directed 1PP while their physical 
body is upward-directed in supine posture (Blanke et al. 
2002, 2004; De Ridder et al. 2007). Our results also extend 
previous FBI studies in healthy individuals (Pfeiffer et al. 
2013; Ionta et al. 2011) where downward-directed view-
points were used to induce visuovestibular conflict about 
the direction of constant gravitational acceleration. These 
manipulations induced between-subjects changes of the 
subjective 1PP (i.e., in terms of the experienced direction 
of the 1PP). In the present study, downward- and upward-
directed visuospatial viewpoint manipulation induced con-
gruent changes of the subjective 1PP within-subjects. Our 
data indicate that visuospatial viewpoint manipulations are 
more powerful in altering the subjective 1PP across sub-
jects when compared to visuovestibular conflicts used in 
previous studies (Pfeiffer et al. 2013; Ionta et al. 2011).
Body-specific manipulation of subjective 1PP
In the present study, subjective 1PP was modulated by 
viewpoint only when a virtual human body was presented, 
but not for a non-body object. This body-specific effect was 
found during ongoing synchronous stroking that is known 
to induce self-identification with the virtual body, but not a 
non-body object as in previous FBI studies (Lenggenhager 
et al. 2007; Aspell et al. 2010; Petkova and Ehrsson 2008).
Similar body-specific effects have previously been 
described in related studies on BSC. For example, the rubber 
hand illusion is abolished when a non-body object instead 
of a fake hand is shown (Tsakiris and Haggard 2005). Simi-
larly, a body-shaped object, such as a mannequin, but not 
a non-body object, allows inducing the FBI (Aspell et al. 
2009; Lenggenhager et al. 2007). Brain imaging work has 
shown that a network of posterior brain regions is highly 
tuned to extract the visual shape of body parts or whole bod-
ies, for example in the extrastriate body area in the lateral 
occipital cortex (Kanwisher et al. 1997; Astafiev et al. 2004; 
Gentile et al. 2013). This literature also provides evidence 
that visual processing of the body (or face) depends on the 
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spatial orientation of the image (de Gelder et al. 2010; Min-
nebusch and Daum 2009 for reviews). This has been tested 
by the body/face inversion effect, consisting in RT or neu-
ral activation differences for visual processing upright ver-
sus inverted body or face (but not object) stimuli. The body 
inversion effect gradually depends on the angular deviation 
magnitude between upright and rotated image (Minnebusch 
et al. 2010). Accordingly, our visual body stimuli differed 
in the rotational tilt of the body stimulus with respect to 
the camera viewpoint (Fig. 1c). Based on the previous lit-
erature, it seems plausible that the body processing brain 
network encoded orientation differences of the virtual body 
(but not the non-body object) and that therefore subjective 
1PP ratings depended on information encoded in the body 
processing network.
Other studies have shown that vision of bodily shapes is 
relevant to multisensory integration and seeing one’s own 
body enhances touch processing (Kennett et al. 2001) and 
reduces tactile pain (Longo et al. 2012) as compared to see-
ing a non-body object. In addition to that, these body-spe-
cific effects on the subjective 1PP show that global visual 
features alone cannot induce these changes, but that more 
detailed visuospatial information is required. Specifically, 
in both body and object conditions, global visual features 
were identical. Thus, the location where the visual perspec-
tival lines converged on the display was identical, i.e., for 
high viewpoint the lines converged in the lower part of the 
screen, whereas for low viewpoints the lines converged in 
the upper part of the screen. Yet subjective 1PP was modu-
lated differently by the visual viewpoint only in the body 
condition.
Subjective 1PP and visuospatial viewpoint
Our results showed that subjective 1PP ratings (i.e., 
upward, downward) depended on the visuospatial view-
point inclination angle (i.e., upward for low viewpoint, 
downward for high viewpoint) when a virtual body was 
seen. This suggests that visuospatial viewpoint information 
is highly relevant to subjective 1PP experience.
Are subjective 1PP ratings more than judgments of visual 
features of the experimental stimuli? This is indeed sug-
gested by the absence of viewpoint effects on subjective 
1PP ratings when a non-body object was seen, i.e., subjec-
tive 1PP ratings were at chance level for both viewpoint 
conditions when a non-body object was shown (see Fig. 2a). 
Furthermore, visual judgments would have led to extreme 
values for subjective 1PP ratings (i.e., 0 or 1 proportion of 
downward 1PP rating). This was not observed, rather, for 
each participant subjective 1PP ratings ranged between .2 
and .9 proportion per experimental condition, which is also 
reflected in the group average proportions ranging in Exper-
iment 1 from .2 to .75 proportion downward rating (Fig. 2a) 
and in Experiment 2 from .3 to .6 proportion downward 
rating (Fig. 2d). Furthermore, in a previous FBI study, we 
presented the same downward-directed visuospatial view-
point to all participants but observed individual differences 
in subjective 1PP ratings depending on visuovestibular inte-
gration and furthermore found within-subjects modulation 
of subjective 1PP ratings by visuotactile stroking (Pfeiffer 
et al. 2013). We note that two perceptual interpretations 
of our visual stimuli were possible. Participants may have 
either experienced viewing the scene from a fixed camera 
viewpoint and a virtual body in front of them at different 
rotational tilt angles or they may have experienced view-
ing a virtual body at a fixed spatial orientation from differ-
ently tilted camera viewpoints. Whereas the former experi-
ence (i.e., fixed viewpoint) should have decreased variance 
in 1PP ratings across conditions, the latter experience (i.e., 
fixed virtual body) could have been associated in viewpoint-
dependent changes of 1PP ratings as observed in our experi-
ments. However, our study did not directly address this 
issue and further studies should directly address this issue. 
Together, the present and the previous results show that 
in healthy subjects during the FBI subjective 1PP ratings 
depend on visual, vestibular, and tactile signals. Further-
more, visuospatial viewpoint information is highly relevant 
to subjective 1PP ratings, but only if a virtual body is seen.
Subjective 1PP: no modulation by visuotactile stroking
Results from the second experiment showed no effects of 
visuotactile stimulation on the subjective 1PP. This obser-
vation differs from previous data showing that asynchro-
nous stroking induced more frequent ‘downward’ 1PP 
ratings than synchronous stroking (Pfeiffer et al. 2013). 
However, different degrees of visuovestibular conflict were 
used in these studies, i.e., 180° directional conflicts were 
used in the study by Pfeiffer et al. (2013) and 90° direc-
tional conflicts were used in the present study. Thus, mul-
tisensory—visual, tactile, and vestibular—signals seem to 
determine the subjective 1PP. Moreover, we note that visu-
otactile stimuli related to the stroking manipulation were 
uninformative about the spatial configuration of the virtual 
body and the participant’s body with respect to the external 
environment. That is, in all experimental conditions, visual 
stroking (i.e., red dots) and tactile stroking (i.e., touch at 
the back) were applied to the back of the virtual body and 
participant’s body and were seen from 2-m distance. The 
observation that visuotactile stroking in the present condi-
tions does not modulate the subjective 1PP raises the ques-
tion which combinations of multisensory visual-tactile-
vestibular stimulus combinations most strongly affect the 
subjective 1PP. Previous behavioral and psychophysics 
studies have provided evidence that the perception of the 
spatial orientation of the own body in space is affected, 
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for instance, by footsole pressure (Lackner 1992; Lack-
ner and DiZio 2000), neck-muscle vibration (Lackner and 
DiZio 2005), large-field optokinetic stimulation (De Saed-
eleer et al. 2013), or static tilts of the visual environments 
(Tiliket et al. 1996). These multisensory effects on spa-
tial perception suggest that similar stimulations may also 
impact spatial aspects of BSC, in particular the subjective 
1PP.
Subjective 1PP relationship to self-location
In addition to the effects on 1PP, our results showed that 
self-location was affected by viewpoint. In the first experi-
ment in the elevated viewpoint condition, subjects judged 
themselves to be higher above the ground, whereas the low-
ered viewpoint was associated with self-location that was 
closer to the ground. Thus, self-location and 1PP were sim-
ilarly affected by viewpoint. Associations between 1PP and 
self-location were also found previously between-subjects 
during visuovestibular conflict (Ionta et al. 2011; Pfeiffer 
et al. 2013). The present study shows congruency between 
subjective 1PP and self-location only in these conditions 
and not related to stroking or for the non-body object.
We argue that the absence of an association between 
1PP and self-location in the present study may be explained 
by the fact that weak and constant visuovestibular con-
flicts were employed and thus the present study differed 
from the results of previous studies where strong visuoves-
tibular conflicts were presented (Pfeiffer et al. 2013; Ionta 
et al. 2011). More precisely, in the present experiment the 
visuovestibular conflict (between the visual gravity cues of 
the virtual body and the vestibular cues of the participant’s 
body) were less strong. There was only a 90° visuovestib-
ular angle difference in the present study, whereas (Ionta 
et al. 2011) employed a conflict of 180°. Here, we manipu-
lated the visual viewpoint, thus the visuospatial represen-
tation showed less consistent effects on self-location, but 
more consistent effects on 1PP.
Self-identification: no modulation by visuospatial 
viewpoint
Self-identification with a virtual body depended on the syn-
chrony between stroking felt on one’s own body and seen 
on the avatar’s body, self-identification was stronger when 
seeing a virtual body, and independent of the participant’s 
visuospatial viewpoint manipulation. We found in the first 
experiment higher self-identification with a virtual body 
than a non-body object when stroked synchronously, and 
in the second experiment, higher self-identification ratings 
for synchronous than asynchronous stroking. Our results 
confirm previous bodily illusion studies that manipulated 
the synchrony of visuotactile stroking or tapping on virtual 
or fake hands (Botvinick and Cohen 1998), faces (Sforza 
et al. 2010; Tsakiris 2008), or whole bodies (Ehrsson 2007; 
Lenggenhager et al. 2007). Our results also agree with the 
previous studies showing body-specific effects of strok-
ing for fake hands (Tsakiris and Haggard 2005) and whole 
bodies (Lenggenhager et al. 2007; Aspell et al. 2009). 
Together, the present results confirm that low-level cues in 
multisensory stimuli, such as temporal synchrony, as well 
as high-level body shape information, are processed by the 
central nervous system to generate self-identification with 
the whole body. Furthermore, our results show that our 
manipulations of viewpoint did not prevent or modulate the 
induction of the FBI and that using well-controlled robotic 
stroking and virtual reality can be used to manipulate self-
identification with a virtual body.
However, viewpoint manipulation did not affect self-
identification in both our experiments and this seems to 
contradict viewpoint effects reported in the study by Slater 
et al. (2010) for virtual body transfer and by Petkova et al. 
(2011) for the FBI. These studies did find that different 
visuospatial viewpoints affected subjective ratings of self-
identification and objective measures, such as heart beat 
and skin conductance response. However, these authors 
manipulated egocentric versus allocentric visuospatial 
viewpoints and thus compared the effects of extracorporal 
(third-person) and body-centered (first-person) viewpoints. 
On the contrary, in the present study, we compared two 
allocentric, i.e., two extracorporeal, viewpoints, and then 
we measured their effects on different aspects of BSC.
In other words, the studies by Slater et al. (2010) and 
Petkova et al. (2011) compared a visuospatial viewpoint 
that was embodied within a virtual body with a disem-
bodied viewpoint (as seen from a distance) from a virtual 
body, reporting stronger self-identification for embodied 
versus disembodied viewpoints. In our study, we com-
pared two disembodied viewpoints that differed in terms of 
the elevation along the vertical axis. Using the same dis-
tance between both disembodied viewpoints from the vir-
tual body, our viewpoints were either elevated-downward 
directed or lowered-upward directed. Therefore, our results 
do not contradict, but rather extend the results by Slater 
et al. (2010) and Petkova et al. (2011) by showing that self-
identification with a virtual body from a distance does not 
depend on elevation or direction of viewpoint, but can be 
achieved under different visuospatial conditions.
Conclusion
Manipulating the visuospatial viewpoint elevation level 
above the ground from which healthy participants observed 
a humanoid virtual body induced congruent changes of 
the experienced direction of the subjective 1PP. Similar 
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manipulation of visuospatial viewpoints for observing a 
non-body object did not modulate subjective 1PP experi-
ence, indicating that visuospatial viewpoints affected the 
subjective experience at what ‘I’ am directed (i.e., subjec-
tive 1PP) only if a humanoid body shape was seen. Visu-
ospatial viewpoint manipulations had no effects on self-
identification with a virtual body, which rather depended on 
visuotactile stroking synchrony. Thus, subjective 1PP and 
self-identification depended on different sensory stimula-
tion parameters, suggesting potentially distinct underlying 
neural representation. Together, our results provide evi-
dence for a close relationship between visual processing 
of body shape and visuospatial viewpoints contributing 
to spatial aspects of BSC. Furthermore, our results extend 
previous studies by demonstrating for the first time that 
within-subjects manipulation of subjective 1PP is mal-
leable. More generally, our study showed that combining 
virtual reality, robotics technology, and cognitive neurosci-
ence experimental approaches can further our understand-
ing of the neurobiological basis of self-consciousness.
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